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ARTICLE 
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Dr. Wells Mangrum† and Professor Richard Collin Mangrum†† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early American common law, courts permitted experts to testify only if 
the opinion would be helpful to the trier of fact, narrowly interpreting that 
scope.1 Some courts in the nineteenth century permitted expert testimony if 
it would be helpful on such things as the authorship of handwriting.2 In the 
area of medical testimony, the Iowa Supreme Court in 1919 refused to permit 
a physician to explain that an x-ray or “skiagraph” depicted “a curvature of 
the spine,” holding, under the original writing rule, that the document speaks 
for itself.3 In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in Frye v. United States,4 became the first court to adopt a more 
analytical approach to expert testimony. This approach became known as the 
Frye standard of “general acceptance” for expert testimony: 
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 1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901). 
 2. Marcy v. Barnes, 82 Mass. 161 (1860). 
It is a general rule, that the court is to determine in the first instance, upon the 
evidence produced, whether the witness offered is qualified by his peculiar skill, 
knowledge and experience in any particular art or employment, to testify as to 
his opinion as an expert; and unless the evidence upon which the determination 
to allow the witness to testify in that manner is reported, the decision is not open 
to revision in another court. 
Id. at 164.  See also President of Quinsigamond Bank v. Hobbs, 77 Mass. 250, 257 (1858) (“The 
authorities show that Southgate’s testimony, that in his opinion all the words in the note in 
suit were written at the same time, was within the legal province of an expert.”); Recent Case, 
Evidence-Expert Testimony-Age of Handwriting, 13 HARV. L. REV. 691 (1900) (“It seems a 
better doctrine to allow the trial judge to determine in each particular case whether the jury 
would be legitimately helped by an expert’s opinion.”). 
 3. Lang v. Marshalltown, 170 N.W. 463, 464-65 (Iowa 1919) (“[W]e are of the opinion 
that the court erred in permitting the doctor to testify to what appeared in the skiagraph” 
(quoting Elzig v. Bales, 112 N. W. 540, 541 (Iowa 1907))).   
 4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).   
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way 
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized 
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.5 
Following the Frye case, most courts adopted the Frye standard of “general 
acceptability” for admitting expert testimony. Excepting “novel” expert 
testimony that had not acquired “general acceptability” amongst the relevant 
scientific community, courts were now permitted to admit expert testimony 
subject to the crucibles of cross-examination, rebuttal expert testimony, and 
closing arguments.6 However, the Frye standard began receiving criticism for 
providing a basis to exclude some expert testimony that may assist the trier 
of fact. 7 
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 Several of the 
newly-enacted rules addressed the issue of the admissibility of expert 
testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 broadly permitted expert 
testimony if the testimony would “help the trier of fact,”9 leaving unanswered 
whether the Frye standard of “general acceptability” remained as the 
threshold standard for what it meant to “help the trier of fact.” 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 703 authorized experts, for the first time, to 
rely upon inadmissible evidence in forming their opinions “[i]f experts in the 
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an 
opinion on the subject.”10 
                                                                                                                                      
 5. Id. at 1014. 
 6. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) (“This criterion of ‘general acceptance’ in 
the scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the courts in the country 
which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence.”). 
 7. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (“Some criticism has been directed at 
the Frye standard, primarily on the ground that the test is too conservative, often resulting in 
the prevention of the admission of relevant evidence.”). 
 8. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (The United States 
Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 pursuant to the Rules 
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2072, in which Congress delegated to the judicial branch the 
authority to promulgate rules related to the procedures of the federal courts.  The Supreme 
Court attempted to enact the Federal Rules of Evidence under The Rules Enabling Act, but 
Congress refused and instead enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute in 1975.). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 803(18) created an important hearsay 
exception especially designed for experts to include statements contained in 
a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if: 
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on 
cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct 
examination; and 
 
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the 
expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or 
by judicial notice. 
 
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not 
received as an exhibit.11 
Notwithstanding the statutory changes related to expert testimony, the 
courts were confused about the standard for admissibility for expert 
testimony. Many federal courts interpreted Rule 702 as adopting  the old 
common law Frye standard of “general acceptability.”12 Other courts and 
commentators suggested that the Frye standard had serious flaws and should 
only be one of many factors considered in admitting expert testimony.13 
Some courts and commentators suggested that the Frye standard unduly 
restricted the admissibility of expert testimony.14 On the opposite end, some 
                                                                                                                                      
 11. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). 
 12. Andrea A. Moenssens, Requiem for the “General Acceptance” Standard in Forensic 
Science, in LEGAL MEDICINE 275, 279-80 (Cyril H. Wecht ed. 1982). 
 13. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).  
[T]he Frye test suffers from serious flaws.  The test has proved to be too malleable 
to provide the method for orderly and uniform decision-making envisioned by 
some of its proponents.  Moreover, in its pristine form the general acceptance 
standard reflects a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific 
evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  For these reasons, we conclude that “general acceptance in 
the particular field to which [a scientific technique] belongs,” . . . should be 
rejected as an independent controlling standard of admissibility.  Accordingly, 
we hold that a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific technique within the 
scientific community is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
admissibility; it is, however, one factor that a district court normally should 
consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon the technique.   
Id. See also State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); United States v. Smith, 
736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24 
(Cal. 1984) (en banc). 
 14. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Unless an exaggerated 
popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to 
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legal and scientific scholars began to express concern over “junk science”15 
readily being admitted in trials under the too-permissive Frye standard.16 
Other commentators suggested that admissibility under Rule 702 should be 
analyzed under the civil preponderance standard for civil cases and the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for expert evidence offered against the 
accused.17 Uncertainty prevailed on what changes, if any, the newly enacted 
Federal Rules of Evidence required for expert testimony. 
Everything changed dramatically in 1993 when the United States Supreme 
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.18 In Daubert, 
parents, on behalf of infants, sued a pharmaceutical company to recover for 
birth defects allegedly caused by the mother’s ingestion of a “morning 
sickness” pill marketed under the name, “Bendectin.”19 The plaintiffs 
presented the testimony of eight qualified experts who each based their 
opinions that Bendectin presented a risk factor for birth defects based upon 
the unpublished “reanalysis” of previously-published human statistical 
studies.20 The trial and appellate court excluded the expert testimony related 
to the proffered general causation theory on the basis that the theory of 
causation did not meet Frye’s “generally accepted” theory of admissibility. 
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court and decided several 
issues that have controlled the admissibility of expert testimony in the federal 
                                                                                                                                      
mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other 
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation.”); 
see also United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“The Frye test of general 
acceptance . . . precludes too much relevant evidence . . . .”); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 
431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (“Every useful new development must have its first day in court.  And 
court records are full of the conflicting opinions of doctors, engineers, and accountants, to 
name just a few of the legions of expert witnesses.”). 
 15. Kenneth Cheesbro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 
1637, 1693-96 (1993). 
 16. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 636-37; 
Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should He Retire?, 16 W. ST. U. 
L. REV. 357, 367-68 (1989); Frederick B. Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS 254, 265 
(1984) (Frye jurisdictions will always lag behind advances in science); Joseph G. Petrosinelli, 
Note & Comment, The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A New Methodology, 79 GEO. L.J. 313, 
317 (1990). 
 17. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, 
A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1248-50 (1980) (criminal defendant and civil 
litigants should be required to establish the validity of the scientific principle or technique by 
a preponderance of the evidence; the prosecution in a criminal trial should be required to 
prove validity beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 19. Id. at 582. 
 20. Id. at 583. 
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courts and most state courts ever since.21 First, the Court clearly held that 
Rule 702 did not adopt Frye’s “generally accepted” standard for 
admissibility.22 Second, under a combination of the relevancy standard 
contained in Rule 402 and the expert standard contained in Rule 702, the 
Court determined that the trial court has a “gatekeeping” responsibility to 
“ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.”23 The Court explained that  
in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence 
presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a 
reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not 
is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, Fed.Rule 
Civ.Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, 
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56.24 
Third, the Court observed that “[t]he primary locus of this obligation is 
Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the 
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.”25 Fourth, the Court 
stated that the reliability and admissibility of expert testimony depends upon 
whether the theories and methodologies relied upon by the expert in forming 
their opinion have been (1) scientifically “tested,”26 (2) the testing has been 
subject of peer-reviewed critique and publication,27 (3) the testing has 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. As of November 23, 2018, Westlaw indicates that Daubert has been cited 143,324 
times. 
 22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.6 (“[W]e hold that Frye has been superseded and base the 
discussion that follows on the content of the congressionally enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 
. . .”).   
 23. Id. at 589 n.7. 
 24. Id. at 596. 
 25. Id. at 589. 
 26. Id. at 593 (“Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and 
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes 
science from other fields of human inquiry.” (citing ERIC GREEN & CHARLES NESSON, 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983))); see also CARL HEMPEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific 
explanation must be capable of empirical test.”); KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND 
REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 48 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of 
the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication. . . . The fact of publication (or lack 
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, 
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or 
methodology on which an opinion is premised. 
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produced an “known” “rate of error,”28 and (4) the “general acceptability” of 
the theories and methodologies (a deferential reference to the earlier Frye 
standard) is relevant, but neither necessary nor sufficient.29 
Daubert assigned the trial court the role of “gatekeeper” for unreliable 
expert testimony, which dramatically altered the judge’s role with respect to 
the admissibility of expert testimony.30 Rather than answering a single 
question, “is it novel scientific evidence,” the judge was given the 
responsibility to review Daubert’s four-part test of “reliability” with respect 
to the underlying theories31 and methodologies,32  if not the conclusions they 
generated.33 
Given Daubert’s sea change for admitting expert testimony, the next 
question was the standard of review for a trial court’s expert testimony 
decision. The Supreme Court, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,34 extended 
broad discretion to trial courts by recognizing an “abuse of discretion” 
                                                                                                                                      
Id. 
 28. Id. at 594. 
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily 
should consider the known or potential rate of error, see, e.g., United States v. 
Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 ([7th Cir.] 1989) (surveying studies of the error rate 
of spectrographic voice identification technique), and the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, see United 
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 ([2nd Cir.] 1978) (noting professional 
organization's standard governing spectrographic analysis), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1117, (1979). 
Id. at 594. 
 29. Id. (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A ‘reliability 
assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant 
scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within 
that community.’” (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985))); 
see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE ¶ 702.03, 702-41-42 (2d 
ed. 2018). 
 30. Id. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter 
how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights 
and innovations.” (emphasis added)).  
 31. Id. at 593 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication.”).   
 32. Id. (“Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them 
to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other 
fields of human inquiry.” (citing GREEN & NESSON, supra note 26, at 645; see also HEMPEL, 
supra note 26, at 49 (“[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable 
of empirical test.”); POPPER, supra note 26, at 48 (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a 
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (emphasis deleted)). 
 33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and 
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”). 
 34. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
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standard of review for all Daubert trial-judge determinations. The Court then 
extended the Daubert analysis to experienced-based expert testimony in 
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael.35 The Court also held in Weisgram v. 
Marley Co.36 that an appellate court may order an entry of judgment for the 
verdict loser when a trial court has excluded evidence under Daubert, 
reinforcing the responsibility of counsel at trial to ensure that a sufficient 
Daubert foundation has been provided. Finally, the Court decided in Cavazos 
v. Smith,37 a shaken-baby case, that once a trial court conducts a proper 
Daubert analysis and admits expert testimony, the weight of that testimony 
is for the jury.38 
  The Daubert paradigmatic change for expert testimony in the federal 
courts dramatically impacted the issue of admissibility of expert testimony in 
both federal and state courts, making the subject one of the most commonly 
reviewed issues on appeal.39 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert, many states abandoned the Frye test and adopted the Daubert 
analysis as controlling under state law.40 Many of the states that did not 
expressly adopt the Daubert standard relied on the Daubert decision for 
guidance in determining their own standards for the admissibility of expert 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 36. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 443 (2000). 
 37. Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 2 (2011) 
 38. Id. at 8. 
In light of the evidence presented at trial, the Ninth Circuit plainly erred in 
concluding that the jury's verdict was irrational, let alone that it was 
unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to think otherwise. . . .  Doubts 
about whether Smith is in fact guilty are understandable.  But it is not the job of 
this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whether the State's 
theory was correct.  The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported 
by the record. 
Id. 
 39. As of November 23, 2018, Westlaw indicates that Daubert has been cited 143,324 
times. 
 40. See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 758-59 (D.C. 2016) (“We adopt Rule 
702 to apply to the trial of this case and to any civil or criminal case in which the trial begins 
after the date of this opinion.”); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001); 
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 742 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard); 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (“We accept the basic 
reasoning of the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated 
reliability.”); State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 471 (Mont. 1994), abrogated by State v. Gollehon, 
906 P.2d 697 (Mont. 1995), and Billings v. Bruce, 965 P.2d 866 (Mont. 1998) (“We conclude 
that the guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our previous holding in Barmeyer 
concerning the admission of expert testimony of novel scientific evidence, and we, therefore, 
adopt the Daubert standard for the admission of scientific expert testimony.”). 
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testimony.41 The few states that have retained the Frye single-factor standard 
of general acceptability have generally modified that standard.42 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. See, e.g., People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 78-79 (Colo. 2001).  
[W]e conclude that CRE 702, rather than Frye, represents the appropriate 
standard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.  We hold that 
under this standard, the focus of a trial court's inquiry should be on the reliability 
and relevance of the scientific evidence, and that such an inquiry requires a 
determination as to (1) the reliability of the scientific principles; (2) the 
qualifications of the witness; and (3) the usefulness of the testimony to the jury.  
We also hold that when a trial court applies CRE 702 to determine the reliability 
of scientific evidence, its inquiry should be broad in nature and consider the 
totality of the circumstances of each specific case. 
Id.; Ingram v. State, 699 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Ind. 1998) (“In determining reliability, while various 
factors have been identified, there is no specific ‘test’ or set of ‘prongs' which must be 
considered in order to satisfy Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b).” (quoting McGrew v. State, 682 
N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind. 1997)));  
Such factors may include, but are not limited to: 1) whether the technique has 
been or can be empirically tested; 2) whether the technique has been subjected 
to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error, as well as 
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's 
operation; and 4) general acceptance within the relevant scientific community. 
Ingram, 699 N.E.2d at 262 n.5 (quoting McGrew, 682 N.E.2d at 1292)); State v. Hungerford, 
697 A.2d 916, 922 (N.H. 1997). 
Specifically, we considered important the presence of objective, quantifiable 
evaluation results, the existence of a “logical nexus” between the expert's 
observations and conclusions, the verifiability of any interpretive steps, and the 
likely difficulty of effective cross-examination of the expert. . . .  Also helpful are 
the considerations enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert.  
In applying Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Daubert Court discussed four 
considerations bearing upon the reliability and helpfulness of scientific evidence: 
(1) whether the theory or technique has been or can be tested; (2) whether the 
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the 
potential or known error rate; and (4) whether there is general acceptance of the 
theory or technique in the relevant scientific community. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648, 658-59 (Nev. 2010).  
By not adopting the Daubert standard as a limitation on judges' considerations 
with respect to the admission of expert testimony, we give Nevada trial judges 
wide discretion, within the parameters of NRS 50.275, to fulfill their gatekeeping 
duties.  We determine that the framework provided by NRS 50.275 sets a degree 
of regulation upon admitting expert witness testimony, without usurping the 
trial judge's gatekeeping function. 
. . . .  
. . . In sum, Daubert, as any other case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, is 
looked upon favorably by this court.  We do not, however, adopt the Daubert 
standard as a limitation on the factors considered for admissibility of expert 
witness testimony.  We hold that NRS 50.275 provides the standard for 
admissibility of expert witness testimony in Nevada. 
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Almost simultaneously, and largely independently of the Daubert 
revolution in the law of evidence, the medical teaching and practice 
communities began adopting a paradigm shift known as “evidence-based 
medicine.” The term “evidence-based medicine” was first coined in 1991, two 
years before Daubert was decided.43 The “evidence-based medicine working 
group” coined the phrase and identified the “paradigm shift” for the practice 
and teaching of medicine as follows: 
A new philosophy of medical practice and teaching has followed 
these methodological advances. This paradigm shift is manifested 
in a number of ways. A profusion of articles has been published 
instructing clinicians on how to access, evaluate, and interpret the 
medical literature. Proposals to apply the principles of clinical 
                                                                                                                                      
Id.; McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997).  
[W]e conclude that Tennessee’s adoption of Rules 702 and 703 in 1991 as part of 
the Rules of Evidence supersede the general acceptance test of Frye.  In 
Tennessee, under the recent rules, a trial court must determine whether the 
evidence will substantially assist the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue and 
whether the facts and data underlying the evidence indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness.  The rules together necessarily require a determination as to the 
scientific validity or reliability of the evidence.  Simply put, unless the scientific 
evidence is valid, it will not substantially assist the trier of fact, nor will its 
underlying facts and data appear to be trustworthy, but there is no requirement 
in the rule that it be generally accepted.   
Although we do not expressly adopt Daubert, the non-exclusive list of factors to 
determine reliability are useful in applying our Rules 702 and 703.  A Tennessee 
trial court may consider in determining reliability: (1) whether scientific 
evidence has been tested and the methodology with which it has been tested; (2) 
whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) 
whether a potential rate of error is known; (4) whether, as formerly required by 
Frye, the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific community; and (5) 
whether the expert's research in the field has been conducted independent of 
litigation. 
Id. 
 42. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1252 (Cal. 2012) (Although 
previously following the Frye standard, the court explained that the trial court, in considering 
expert testimony, should “conduct[] a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to ‘determine whether, as a 
matter of logic, the studies and other information cited by experts adequately support the 
conclusion that the expert’s general theory or technique is valid.’ The goal of trial court 
gatekeeping is simply to exclude ‘clearly invalid and unreliable’ expert opinion.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 43. Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the 
Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420 (1992); see also Benjamin Djulbegovic & 
Gordon Guyatt, Progress in Evidence-Based Medicine: A Quarter Century On, 390 LANCET 415 
(2017). 
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epidemiology to day-to-day clinical practice have been put 
forward. A number of major medical journals have adopted a 
more informative structured abstract format, which incorporates 
issues of methods and design into the portion of an article the 
reader sees first. The American College of Physicians has launched 
a journal, ACP Journal Club, that summarizes new publications of 
high relevance and methodological rigor. Textbooks that provide 
a rigorous review of available evidence, including a methods 
section describing both the methodological criteria used to 
systematically evaluate the validity of the clinical evidence and the 
quantitative techniques used for summarizing the evidence, have 
begun to appear. Practice guidelines based on rigorous 
methodological review of the available evidence are increasingly 
common. A final manifestation is the growing demand for courses 
and seminars that instruct physicians on how to make more 
effective use of the medical literature in their day-to-day patient 
care. We call the new paradigm "evidence-based medicine."44 
The similarity and timing of the paradigm shift to evidence-based 
medicine and the Court’s paradigm shift in Daubert to assessing the 
reliability of the “principles and methodologies” is striking and compatible, 
but the overlapping coherence of the two separate domains has seldom been 
recognized by either profession. 
This paper discusses how the paradigm shift of evidence-based-medicine 
and the tools developed in that genre provide an important basis at every 
stage of any expert’s “health related” testimony under the Daubert standard 
of admissibility.45 
II.  DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 26(B)(2) 
A.  Qualification of the Expert 
The first foundational step for admitting any expert testimony under 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 is the qualification of the expert by 
education, training, or experience to give relevant expert testimony that “will 
assist the trier of fact.”46 For a medical malpractice claim, expert testimony is 
                                                                                                                                      
 44. Guyatt, supra note 43, at 2421. 
 45. Brief for Wisconsin Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bayer 
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 2015AP1470), 2015 
WL 9596321. 
 46. Diefenbach v. Sheridan Transp., 229 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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typically required as part of the prima facie case.47 If the jurisdiction by statute 
or common law follows the “local practice” rule, an expert will have to have 
experience and training with respect to the local practice to be qualified to 
give testimony on the “local standard of care.”48 Additionally, “[p]ractitioners 
in one specialty are not ordinarily competent to testify as experts on the 
standard of care applicable to another specialty.”49 For example, an 
orthopedic surgeon would be qualified to testify about subjects within the 
ambit of the field of orthopedic surgery, but would not be qualified to testify 
about the standard of care for a nurse over which he had supervisory 
responsibility, due to the “wide variation between schools in both precepts 
and practices.”50 In assessing qualification, the expert’s familiarity with the 
principles of evidence-based medicine is critical when addressing health-
related opinions. 
B. Principles or Theories of Reliability 
Once an expert is qualified in a relevant area under investigation, the next 
Daubert question is the reliability of the underlying principles or theories 
upon which the expert relied. Many attorneys have a difficult time 
formulating the principle or theory upon which health-related questions are 
framed. Theories can be both general and specific with respect to both the 
differential diagnosis and etiology. 
The most general theory question for health-related questions, should be: 
                                                                                                                                      
It is well-settled that trial judges have broad discretionary powers in determining 
the qualification, and thus, admissibility, of expert witnesses. It is settled law in 
this circuit that [w]hether a witness is qualified to express an expert opinion is a 
matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. In the absence of clear error, 
as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision will not be reversed. 
Id. (quoting Richmond Steel Inc. v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)) 
(internal quotations omitted).   
 47. Blevens v. Halcomb, 469 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Testimony that a physician 
failed to live up to some vague ‘standard of care,’ without elaboration as to the content of that 
standard, is insufficient to satisfy this burden.” (citing Ladish v. Gordon, 879 S.W.2d 623, 634 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994))). 
 48. Jerden v. Amstutz, 430 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The specific basis for 
Defendant's objection to Dr. Gross's testimony should have been asserted when Dr. Gross 
testified as to Defendant's compliance with his standard of care without reciting that he had 
knowledge of the proper medical conduct within Defendant's community.”). 
 49. Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 232 P.3d 529, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (holding a 
general pediatric physician was not qualified to give testimony on breach of the standard of 
care of a critical care physician or to quantify the chance of survival absent the ventilator 
failure). 
 50. De Adder v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 308 P.3d 543, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 
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Q:  What theory or principle did you rely upon in forming your 
opinion?  
A:  I relied upon the theory or principle of evidence-based 
medicine which helped inform both my general and specific 
causation theories of the case.51 
The follow-up Daubert questions and answers related to this 
question should be: 
Q: Has the theory of evidence-based medicine been tested? 
A: Yes. Each of the studies relied upon by the expert have been 
subjected to peer-reviewed analysis under the principles of 
evidence-based medicine.52 
Q:  Has the testing been subject to peer-reviewed critique? 
A:  Yes. The theory of evidence-based medicine, as a paradigm for 
expert practice, practice guidelines, and expert testimony, was first 
coined in 1992, and has since been subject to countless articles and 
papers in health-related areas.53 
Q:  Has the theory been subject to peer-reviewed critique? 
A:  Yes, since 1992 medical research has been replete with 
discussion of, further elucidation, and refinement of the theory of 
evidence-based medicine. Any Google search of the theory of 
evidence-based medicine will demonstrate the depth of the 
scientific literature validating evidence-based medicine as the 
dominate theory of all health-related training and research.54 
Q:  Is there an established rate of error? 
A:  Yes. The underlying premise of evidence-based medicine is 
that medical hypotheses should be tested and evaluated by 
empirically-based studies formulated to understand the 
appropriate confidence levels of the underlying medical 
assumptions or practice guidelines. The established rate of error 
in each instance is dependent upon the quantity and quality of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 51. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“The adjective 
‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science.”). 
 52. Id. at 593 (1993) (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether 
a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it 
can be (and has been) tested.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 593 (“Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication.”). 
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studies relied upon in forming the specifically applicable medical-
related opinion.55 
Q:  Is the theory of “evidence-based medicine” generally accepted 
in the relevant health-related community? 
A:  Yes, evidence-based medicine has become the norm of medical 
education, practice training, and practice guidelines, as can be 
demonstrated by reference to any medical curriculum.56 
The more specific diagnosis and etiology theories would be more fact-
specific.   
C. Methodologies 
After asking about the principles or theories underling the expert’s 
opinion, the next question on the Daubert checklist is whether the 
methodologies relied upon by the expert in forming his or her opinion satisfy 
the same Daubert reliability standards of “testability,” “peer reviewed 
critique,” “established rate of error,” and “general acceptability”?   
Several of the most “generally accepted” methodologies for evaluating 
health-related conditions include SOAP, differential diagnosis, and 
differential etiology. 
Under the SOAP methodology, the physician (1) considers the subjective 
complaints of the patient, (2) investigates the probabilities by objective tests, 
(3) analyzes the information through a differential diagnosis, and (4) adopts 
a plan of treatment.57 
Under the well-established methodologies of differential diagnosis and 
differential etiology, the health investigator considers all the alternatives 
suggested by the subjective complaints and objective tests, analyzes the 
information provided, rules out the least-likely diagnosis or cause, and 
arrives at a plan or conclusion.58 
In performing the ruling in and ruling out of the differential diagnosis or 
etiology “methodologies,” the answer should be case-specific, depending 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. Id. at 594 (“Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court 
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error . . .”). 
 56. Id. (“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”). 
 57. LYNN S. BICKLEY, BATES’ GUIDE TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND HISTORY TAKING (12th 
ed. 2017). 
 58. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Neb. 203, 237, 762 N.W.2d 24, 50 (2009) 
(“If an expert's general causation opinion is admissible to show that a suspected agent should 
be ruled in as a possible cause of the plaintiff's disease, the court must next determine whether 
the expert performed a reliable differential etiology.”). 
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upon the form of the case study relied upon and its ranking on the evidence-
based medicine pyramid. 
The evidence-based methodology for ruling in and ruling out the 
possibilities to perform the differential diagnosis or etiology has four steps: 
(1) finding the appropriate research study, (2) searching the literature, (3) 
ranking the evidence-based levels of reliability, and (4) critiquing the study 
using the principles of evidence-based medicine.59 
1. The First Methodological Step: Finding the Appropriate Research 
Study that Formulated a Relevant Question 
Medical researchers first formulate the clinical problem being 
investigated.60 Expert witnesses seeking evidence-based support for their 
opinions, investigate the “fit” of the extant studies on the same issue. If no 
study fits precisely under the question being investigated, then the closest 
study should be examined with full recognition that an “unfair factual 
extrapolation”61 argument may be fairly made. The Federal Advisory 
Committee Notes on Rule 702 suggest that whether the relevant study is 
“litigation-dependent” should be considered when deciding admissibility. 62 
As a methodology for formulating the research question, both the 
researcher and the expert must first define precisely whom the question is 
about by asking, “How would I describe a group of patients similar to this 
one?” Demographic features such as age, gender, and race describe the 
patient group. Medical risk factors and conditions also define the patient 
group. Second, the researcher or expert should describe the 
intervention/maneuver that will be performed or has been performed on the 
patient population. Third, if necessary, the researcher or expert should 
provide or investigate a comparison maneuver. For example, the intervention 
can be the administration of a drug or diagnostic radiologic exam and the 
comparison can be a placebo or an alternative diagnostic exam. Fourth, the 
researcher or expert should define the outcome such as reduced mortality or 
improved quality of life.   
                                                                                                                                      
 59. TRISHA GREENHALGH, HOW TO READ A PAPER: THE BASICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED 
MEDICINE 39 (5th ed. 2014).   
 60. Id. 
 61. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one 
purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”).  
 62. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (In 2000, the Advisory Committee Notes 
to Rule 702 identified as a bias factor related to the issue of admissibility and impeachment, 
the “(1) whether” the testimony relates to “matters growing naturally and directly out of 
research they have conducted independent of the litigation,” or developed “expressly for 
purposes of testifying.”). 
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These four steps formulating the question under investigation are 
commonly known by the “PICO” pneumonic: patient group, intervention, 
comparison and outcome.63 Foundation for the PICO methodology can be 
established through the same Daubert checklist: 
Q: Has the PICO methodology for formulating a medical research 
question been tested? 
A: Yes. Each of the studies relied upon by the expert were the 
product of a PICO analysis consistent with the premises of 
evidence-based medicine. 
Q:  Has the specific PICO study been subject to peer-reviewed 
critique? 
A:  Yes.  This study was published in a reputable scientific journal. 
Q:  Is the journal a peer-reviewed journal? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Did the study discuss any probability analysis for the results? 
A: Yes. The study had a probability analysis published as part of 
the research. 
Q:  Are the conclusions of the study generally-accepted in the 
relevant scientific community? 
A:  Yes.    
The “reliability” or “general acceptability” of the study depends, in part, 
upon whether these steps have been adequately taken. Other considerations 
include the quantity and quality of the study. Finally, the question in 
litigation is whether the study is sufficiently analogous to the question being 
litigated that the expert can fairly extrapolate from the study and the theory 
of general causation to the facts of the case or the issue of specific causation. 
2. Second Step: Searching the Literature 
After precisely formulating the clinical problem much like the original 
researcher, the expert, consistent with evidence-based medicine, should 
perform the appropriate literature search.64 Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 
703 enables an expert to rely on inadmissible evidence, such as research 
studies, if the evidence is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.65 Also, 
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(18) permits an expert to read to the trier 
of fact the content of “learned treatises” if they are reasonably relied upon by 
                                                                                                                                      
 63. Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 1802, 
1804 (2015); Marie Staunton, Evidence-Based Radiology: Steps 1 and 2—Asking Answerable 
Questions and Searching for Evidence, 242 RADIOLOGY 23, 24 (2007). 
 64. Id. at 25. 
 65. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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experts in the field.66 These evidentiary rules separately affirm the 
admissibility of “reliable” excerpts from “learned treatises” and specify the 
method the information will be communicated to the trier of fact, both as a 
basis for expert testimony and as independent evidence orally presented to 
the jury. 
Google Scholar and PubMed search the web for useful primary scientific 
literature containing both the studies and the peer reviewed critique 
referenced by the Supreme Court in Daubert. For quick clinical searches, 
Google Scholar returns more relevant articles and provides greater access to 
free full-text articles.67 PubMed is more valuable than Google Scholar when 
performing a more thorough primary literature review.68 The secondary 
literature summarizes the primary literature often through systematic 
reviews, a highly ranked form of evidence under the evidence-based medicine 
paradigm. 
The Cochrane and DARE databases search systematic reviews. These 
reviews have a higher level of evidence and, thus, have more appeal in the 
courtroom. A thorough literature review can be a time-consuming process 
and can be outside of the expertise of many physicians. For this reason, it may 
be worthwhile to employ a health librarian to provide a professional-
literature search. The question of whether an expert did an adequate 
literature review is an important question for either direct or cross-
examination. 
Search Engine URL Contents 
Google Scholar https://scholar.google.com Primary Literature 
PubMed www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ Primary Literature 
Cochrane 
Database http://www.thecochranelibrary.com Systematic Reviews 
DARE 
Database http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/crdweb/ Systematic Reviews 
TRIP Database https://tripdatabase.com Primary and Secondary Literature 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. FED. R. EVID. 803(18). 
 67. Salimah Shariff et al., Retrieving Clinical Evidence: A Comparison of PubMed and 
Google Scholar for Quick Clinical Searches, 15 J. MED. INTERNET RES. E164 (2013); Austin v. Am. 
Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is an abundance 
of up-to-date relevant literature easily retrievable from the World Wide Web.”). 
 68. Michael Anders & Dennis Evans, Comparison of PubMed and Google Scholar 
Literature Searches, 55 RESPIRATORY CARE 578, 582(2010); Wichor M. Bramer et al., The 
Comparative Recall of Google Scholar Versus PubMed in Identical Searches for Biomedical 
Systematic Reviews, 2 SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 115 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1186/2046-4053-2-
115. 
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Once an article of interest is discovered, both a researcher and an expert 
in review should read the articles that have cited the lead article. These cited 
articles may agree or disagree with the findings. Support or criticism would 
be relevant to direct or cross-examination.  Citation chaining can be 
performed easily with Google Scholar. Once an article is found, click on the 
“cited by” feature to find the citation chain. 
3.  Third Step: Ranking the “Evidence-based” Levels of Reliability 
The third step in evidence-based medicine is to lexically order the 
epistemological strength of health-related decision-making and practice 
guidelines to the strength of the supporting empirically-based research. The 
lexical ordering of the studies, often depicted by a “pyramid of reliability,” 
ranks in descending order of reliability empirically-based meta-analyses, 
systematic reviews, randomized controlled trials, case-control studies, 
anecdotal experiences or individualized case-studies, animal studies, and, 
finally, in vitro studies. The lexical ordering has been memorialized by 
various versions of the below depicted evidence-based medicine pyramid: 
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The Oxford Center for Evidence-Based Medicine created a heuristic 
device, the “Levels of Evidence,” that gives a quick assessment of a research 
study’s level of trustworthiness, irrespective of the journal of origin.69 Expert 
witnesses should always consider the “Levels of Evidence” associated with 
any research relied upon. Research studies with a study design ranked at the 
top of the ranking system are held to be more reliable than those at the 
bottom of the ranking system. Originally, one universal rating system was 
created to rank all types of studies. However, experience taught that such a 
simplified rating system overgeneralizes. For example, the study type that 
best determines the effectiveness of a new drug would not be equally effective 
in assessing the quality of a diagnostic test. To adjust to this complexity, the 
current ranking system of Level of Evidence varies depending on the research 
question being asked (see attached tables). 
 
Table 1 of 2.70  
Question Step1  (Level1*) 
Step2  
(Level2*) 
Step3  
(Level3*) 
How 
common is 
the problem? 
Local and current 
random sample 
surveys (or 
censuses) 
Systematic review 
of surveys that 
allow matching to 
local 
circumstances** 
Local non-random 
sample** 
Is this 
diagnostic or 
monitoring 
test accurate? 
(Diagnosis) 
Systematic review 
of cross sectional 
studies with 
consistently 
applied reference 
standard and 
blinding 
Individual cross 
sectional studies 
with consistently 
applied reference 
standard and 
blinding 
Non-consecutive 
studies, or studies 
without consistently 
applied reference 
standards** 
What will 
happen if we 
do not add a 
therapy? 
(Prognosis) 
Systematic review 
of inception 
cohort studies 
Inception cohort 
studies 
Cohort study or 
control arm of 
randomized trial* 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. Jonathan D. Dodd, Evidence-Based Practice in Radiology: Steps 3 and 4—Appraise and 
Apply Diagnostic Radiology Literature, 242 RADIOLOGY 342, 345-46 (2007); OCEBM Levels of 
Evidence, OXFORD CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED MED. (May 1, 2016), 
https://www.cebm.net/2016/05/ocebm-levels-of-evidence/.  
 70. The table can be viewed in its PDF format at http://www.cebm.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/CEBM-Levels-of-Evidence-2.1.pdf. 
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Question Step1  (Level1*) 
Step2  
(Level2*) 
Step3  
(Level3*) 
Does this 
intervention 
help? 
(Treatment 
Benefits) 
Systematic review 
of randomized 
trials or n-of-1 
trials 
Randomized trial 
or observational 
study with 
dramatic effect 
Non-randomized 
controlled 
cohort/follow-up 
study** 
What are the 
COMMON 
harms? 
(Treatment 
Harms) 
Systematic review 
of randomized 
trials, systematic 
review of nested 
case-control 
studies, n- of 1 
trial with the 
patient you are 
raising the 
question about, or 
observational 
study with 
dramatic effect 
Individual 
randomized trial 
or (exceptionally) 
observational 
study with 
dramatic effect 
Non-randomized 
controlled 
cohort/follow-up 
study (post-
marketing 
surveillance) 
provided there are 
sufficient numbers 
to rule out a 
common harm. (For 
long-term harms the 
duration of follow-
up must be 
sufficient.)** 
What are the 
RARE 
harms? 
(Treatment 
Harms) 
Systematic review 
of randomized 
trials or n-of-1trial 
Randomized trial 
or (exceptionally 
observational 
study with 
dramatic effect 
Is this (early 
detection) 
test 
worthwhile? 
(Screening) 
Systematic review 
of randomized 
trials 
Randomized trial 
Non-randomized 
controlled 
cohort/follow-up 
study** 
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Table 2 of 2.71 
Question Step 4 (Level 4*) Step 5 (Level 5) 
How common is the 
problem? Case-series** n/a 
Is this diagnostic or 
monitoring test accurate? 
(Diagnosis) 
Case-control studies, or “poor or 
non-independent reference 
standard** 
Mechanism-
based 
reasoning 
What will happen if we do 
not add a therapy? 
(Prognosis) 
Case-series or case-control 
studies, or poor quality 
prognostic cohort study** 
n/a 
Does this intervention 
help? (Treatment Benefits) 
Case-series, case-control studies, 
or historically controlled 
studies** 
Mechanism-
based 
reasoning 
What are the COMMON 
harms? (Treatment 
Harms) Case-series, case-control, or 
historically controlled studies** 
Mechanism-
based 
reasoning What are the RARE 
harms? (Treatment 
Harms) 
Is this (early detection) 
test worthwhile? 
(Screening) 
Case-series, case-control, or 
historically controlled studies** 
Mechanism-
based 
reasoning 
 
*Level may be graded down on the basis of study quality, imprecision, 
indirectness (study PICO does not match questions PICO), because of 
inconsistency between studies, or because the absolute effect size is very 
small; Level may be graded up if there is a large or very large effect size.  
**As always, a systematic review is generally better than an individual 
study.72  
 
The physician or expert uses the clinical question to find the appropriate 
row in Oxford’s table. The physician or expert then searches for articles that 
receive the level 1 score. If the question is about the efficacy of a therapy, then 
a systematic review of a randomized controlled trial is preferred. If one wants 
to demonstrate the validity of a diagnostic test, then use a systematic review 
                                                                                                                                      
 71. The table can be viewed in its PDF format at http://www.cebm.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/CEBM-Levels-of-Evidence-2.1.pdf.  
 72. OCEBM Levels of Evidence, supra note 69. 
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of a cross-sectional survey. For causation, use a systematic review of cohort 
studies. If no level 1 evidence is found, then the physician or expert proceeds 
down the row to level 2, then level 3, and so on. The Oxford’s Evidence Based 
Medicine Table lexically orders the reliability of studies from least reliable to 
most reliable.  
a.  Lowest Levels of Evidence: Anecdotal Expert Opinions or Case 
Reports 
Science values the opinion of an expert, whether it is based on mechanistic 
reasoning or based on clinical experience, for this opinion often serves as the 
basis to start an empiric investigation. However, an expert’s “experiential” 
opinion without evidence-based research studies to validate or refute, is 
ordered the least reliable of all expert opinions, especially where confirming 
or refuting studies are available, as in the Austin case below. A brief written 
by the Wisconsin Medical Society to the court argues: 
[T]he Society asks this Court to recognize that medical opinions 
that are supported solely by unsystematic clinical observations 
presumptively fail to cross the Daubert reliability threshold. These 
include both a physician’s subjective beliefs based solely on their 
personal credentials and experience as well as medical literature 
identified as case reports. While such evidence may be properly 
part of physicians’ decision-making process, it lacks an objective 
methodology on which physicians, and in turn courts, can rely.  
This is not to say that physician experience and clinical 
observations have no place in expert testimony. Training and 
experience plays a large role in medical analysis and decision 
making, and that training and experience can be incorporated into 
expert testimony. However, from a medical perspective, 
conclusions based solely on experience and anecdote are regarded 
with suspect in their application to other patients and 
circumstances.73  
In Austin v. American Association of Neurological Surgeons,74 the claimant, 
Dr. Austin, sued his medical society for suspending him for “irresponsible 
expert testimony.”75 In denying Dr. Austin’s claim, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained,  
                                                                                                                                      
 73. Brief for Wisconsin Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bayer 
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 2015AP1470), 2015 
WL 9596321, at *9. 
 74. Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 75. Id. at 971. 
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[T]here is little doubt that his [anecdotally-based] testimony was 
irresponsible and that it violated a number of sensible-seeming 
provisions . . . . [Including the provision that a medical society 
member] should provide the court with accurate and 
documentable opinions on the matters at hand.76  
What makes this case interesting is that the court performed its own 
evidence-based medicine literature search on the topic that would have 
placed the anecdotal testimony in an improved context. The court chastised 
the expert witnesses for not doing the literature search that would have 
enhanced the reliability of the expert testimony:  
Oddly, apart from Cloward’s article, and the Watkins article of 
unknown provenance (unknown to the lawyers, that is), no 
literature on anterior cervical fusion or injuries to the recurrent 
laryngeal nerve was presented either to the Association’s hearing 
board or to the district court, although some additional literature 
had been presented at the malpractice trial and there is an 
abundance of up-to-date relevant literature easily retrievable from 
the World Wide Web. There we discover in a cursory search that 
permanent damage to the recurrent laryngeal nerve is a known 
though fortunately rare complication of anterior cervical fusion (a 
1982 study found only 52 cases of paralysis to the recurrent 
laryngeal nerve in 70,000 such operations—.07 percent) against 
which the patients should be warned.77  
In Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. and Medical Center,78 a patient claimed that 
Defendant’s negligence resulted in a delay in diagnosis of a post-operative 
septic knee joint resulting in exacerbation of knee joint destruction. The 
plaintiff’s expert witness, Depuy, based his testimony exclusively on his own 
extensive clinical experience of having performed over two-thousand 
arthroscopic surgeries. In excluding this experienced-based anecdotal 
testimony as too low on the evidence-based medicine pyramid, the court 
explained:  
Depuy’s conclusion, which appears to be based on no scientific 
support other than his own personal experience of not having 
encountered instances of fluid draining from knees of patients on 
whom he has operated, bears none of the hallmarks of reliability 
necessary for it to be considered admissible under Daubert and 
                                                                                                                                      
 76. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 77. Austin, 253 F.3d at 970-71.   
 78. Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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Rule 702 . . . . [O]f the basic four criteria on which a Daubert 
reliability analysis typically rests, two are particularly relevant in 
cases in which the expert testimony is based on personal 
experience: the rate of error of the experience-based methodology 
and “whether such a method is generally accepted in the scientific 
community.” An anecdotal account of one expert’s experience, 
however extensive or impressive the numbers it encompasses, 
does not by itself equate to a methodology, let alone one generally 
accepted by the relevant professional community.79  
b.  Second Lowest Level of Reliability: Case Reports and Case Series 
The Oxford’s Evidence Based Medicine Table ranks a case report or a case 
series as the second lowest level of reliability for evidence-based medicine. A 
case report gives a detailed description of the symptoms, signs, diagnosis, 
treatment and follow-up of an individual patient. The value of a case report 
is in describing a rare or previously unreported event. This report might 
sensitize readers and facilitate detection of similar cases leading to the 
reporting of a case series, a study that organizes multiple case reports around 
a central theme.80 A case series can be used to generate hypotheses for more 
rigorous research studies, but alone is nothing more than the reporting of an 
unreliable anecdotal experience. 
Case reports and case series have many limitations that result in their low 
ranking on the tier of Levels of Evidence. First, these reports and series are 
not chosen from representative populations and consequently cannot 
generate information on incidence or prevalence of disease. Second, case 
studies have no control groups; a large case series can imply a causal 
relationship, but without a control, these case series cannot be relied upon to 
determine a causal relationship.81  
This low estimation of case studies holds for both evidence-based 
medicine and judicial analysis of case studies. For example, in Siharath v. 
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation,82 a post-partum woman suffered a 
hemorrhagic stroke after taking a prescription drug manufactured by the 
defendant.83 The plaintiff tried to prove causality through case reports. In 
granting a summary judgment, the court explained that Plaintiff’s  
                                                                                                                                      
 79. Id. at 354 (internal citation omitted). 
 80. Trygve Nissen & Rolf Wynn, The Clinical Case Report: A Review of its Merits and 
Limitations, 7 BMC RES. NOTES 264 (2014). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2001).   
 83. Id. at 1349, aff’d sub nom.; Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
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experts (1) have failed to provide any evidence, either published 
or unpublished, that Parlodel® increases one’s risk of stroke; (2) 
rely on uncontrolled and unreliable spontaneous reports and 
anecdotal case reports as the basis for their opinions; and (3) 
cannot show that their opinions have an acceptable error rate or 
are otherwise generally accepted.84 
 
The court further explained that Plaintiff did not satisfy their 
burden of proof: 
No evidence has been offered of an increase in postpartum strokes 
after the drug was approved for suppression of lactation; no 
evidence has been offered of a decrease in postpartum strokes after 
the approval for suppression of lactation was withdrawn. The 
absence of epidemiological support raises the question of whether 
the causation opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts are merely speculative 
and not based on scientific knowledge. 85 
 
The court further dissected the case reports the Plaintiff relied 
upon as an unfair extrapolation: 
The [alleged] adverse drug reports . . . lack the requisite quantity, 
nature and content. From 1980 to 1994, millions of women took 
Parlodel®. The modest number of case reports associating the drug 
with stroke or even postpartum hypertension is not what would 
be expected if there was a significant increased risk. Only one 
report exists that links Parlodel® to a stroke, and in that case the 
patient suffered from an underlying condition that itself can cause 
stroke. No other patient in any case reports suffered any form of 
stroke. The other patients instead suffered non-cerebral effects 
such as hypertension and myocardial infarction. Many of the case 
reports cited involved patients who were not postpartum. One 
case report involved a patient who was dechallenged but 
continued to suffer from hypertension for another four to five 
days. In short, Plaintiffs’ [expert has] not pointed to a single case 
report involving a postpartum woman who suffered a 
hemorrhagic stroke. Accordingly, even if case reports could be 
used to establish general causation, any reasonable observer would 
have to conclude that they are insufficient to do so in this case. 
The case reports simply lack the quantity, nature and content that 
                                                                                                                                      
 84. Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1352. 
 85. Id. at 1358 (internal citations omitted).   
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Dr. Dukes himself claims is necessary for case reports to provide 
reliable scientific information about causation.86 
Finally, the court made the point that even Plaintiff’s expert on cross-
examination conceded that case reports can never establish general 
causation: 
Both of Plaintiffs’ experts who testified at the Daubert hearing 
recognize the severe limitations of case reports and differential 
diagnosis in establishing general causation. Dr. Kulig admitted the 
limitations in the following exchange: 
 
Q: As a matter of scientific methodology, Dr. Kulig, case reports 
do not establish general causation and you would never attempt 
to do so, true? 
 
A: True. 
 
Q: And as a matter of scientific methodology, Dr. Kulig, case series 
do not establish general causation and you would never attempt 
to do so, true? 
 
A: True. 
 
Q: And as a matter of scientific methodology, Dr. Kulig, 
differential diagnosis as applied to a specific patient cannot 
establish general causation? 
 
A: In and of itself, I wouldn’t establish it, but now you’re getting 
closer. 
 
Case reports can establish only specific causation. Testimony 
regarding specific causation, however, is irrelevant unless general 
causation is established. Accordingly, given the limits of case 
reports in establishing general causation, as recognized by 
Plaintiffs’ experts, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs’ reliance 
upon case reports as a substitute for epidemiology cannot 
withstand the scrutiny that Daubert requires.87 
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Thus, case studies are generally inadequate sources for establishing 
general causation under evidence-based medicine. 
c.  Third Level or Mid-Tier Levels of Evidence: Observational 
Studies (Case-Control Studies) 
A case-control study compares a group of patients with a disease with 
another group of patients without a disease to determine whether a potential 
causal attribute is more associated with the disease group than the control 
group. A clarifying example occurred in history when Drs. Doll and Hill 
studied whether smoking causes lung cancer. For every newly admitted 
patient with lung cancer, they selected another patient of the same age and 
gender but with a sickness other than lung cancer. They then asked each 
group whether or not they smoked. The results revealed a statistically 
significant relationship between smoking and lung cancer.88  
As implied by their relatively low status of “mid-tiered” on Oxford’s Level 
of Evidence, case-control studies have limitations. One of the biggest 
limitations of case-control studies is that they can show a correlation but they 
cannot prove causation.89 For this reason, Dr. Doll quickly followed his case-
control study with a more reliable case-cohort study, the natural progression 
of evidence-based research.90 Cohort studies compare groups who have been 
“exposed” to an agent at issue, with groups who have not been exposed.91 The 
study compares each group’s rate of disease with or without exposure.92 Case-
control studies, in comparison, compare a group with a disease with a group 
without the disease and investigate past exposures to determine whether an 
association exists between the exposure and the incidence of the disease.93 
However, an association, by itself, cannot establish causation.94 These 
observational studies only show the “degree of statistical relationship 
between two or more events or variables. Events are said to be associated 
when they occur more or less frequently together than one would expect by 
chance.”95 An “association” can be quantified by statistical analysis into 
                                                                                                                                      
 88. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 
739, 740, 746 (1950). 
 89. TRISHA GREENHALGH, HOW TO READ A PAPER: THE BASICS OF EVIDENCE-BASED 
MEDICINE 39 (5th ed. 2014).   
 90. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death in Relation 
to Smoking; A Second Report on the Mortality of British Doctors, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1071 (1956). 
 91. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 340 (2d ed. 2000).  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 342. 
 94. Id. at 374. 
 95. Id. at 387. 
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“relative risk.,”96 “Relative risk” is “defined as the ratio of the incidence rate 
(often referred to as incidence) of disease in exposed individual to the 
incidence rate in unexposed individuals.”97 If the “relative risk” is 1, “the risk 
in exposed individuals is the same as the risk in unexposed individuals.”98 
Thus if the relative risk is 1, then “[t]here is no association between exposure 
to the agent and disease.”99 If the relative risk is greater than 1, “[t]here is a 
positive association between exposure to the agent and the disease, which 
could be causal.”100 From a probability perspective, ““[t]he higher the relative 
risk, the greater the likelihood that the relationship is causal.”101  
Under the court’s “gatekeeping” responsibility under Daubert,102 an expert 
must express an opinion to a reasonable degree of probability, a burden that 
may keep the jury from hearing useful information about association. If the 
“probability” burden were translated directly to the issue of “relative risk,” 
then the relative risk would have to be greater than 2.0 for any expert to 
express an opinion to a reasonable degree of probability. This is because if 
the relative risk is 2.0, “the agent is responsible for an equal number of cases 
of disease as all other background causes.”103 This finding from a probability 
perspective “implies a 50% likelihood than an exposed individual’s disease 
was caused by the agent.”104 Because the Rule 104(a) burden for the 
admissibility of evidence under the Daubert gatekeeping responsibility is 
“reasonable degree of probability,” an expert must express two forms of 
“causation” opinions at “probability” level.105 The first causation opinion is 
that the agent has the capacity of causing the disease or problem at a 
probability level. This “general causation” theory, can be contrasted to the 
                                                                                                                                      
 96. Id. at 348. 
 97. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at 348.  
 98. Id. at 349. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 376. 
 102. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“We recognize that, in 
practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will 
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.” (emphasis added)).  
 103. REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at 384. 
 104. Id. at 384. 
 105. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Neb. 203, 212–13 (2009). (“To prevail, a 
plaintiff must show both general and specific causation. But a court should first consider 
whether a party has presented admissible general causation evidence before considering the 
issue of admissible specific causation evidence.”). 
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second causation opinion, that the agent was the “actual cause,” where other 
possible causes of this particular disease can be reasonably ruled out.106 
Courts considering the “general,”107 “generic,”108 or “capable of causing”109 
theory of causal connection between the subject agent generally have not 
adopted a consensus “statistical” standard of probability for this relationship. 
Some courts have reversed jury verdicts where the supporting statistical 
studies establishing general causation were lacking.110 Some commentators 
have recommended111 and some courts have required proof of a relative risk 
of 2.0 or greater to prove general causation.112 Other courts have not required 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 788 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (contrasting “generic causation—that the defendant was 
responsible for a tort which had the capacity to cause the harm alleged—with individual 
proximate cause and individual damage”). 
 107. Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]estimony 
on specific causation ha[s] legitimacy only as follow-up to [general causation]”); In re Bextra 
& Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 
2007) (“General or generic causation means ‘whether the substance at issue had the capacity 
to cause the harm alleged.’”) (citing In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 
1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (“General, or ‘generic’ causation has been defined by courts to mean 
whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm alleged . . . .”)). 
 108. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (“This enabled 
the court to determine a kind of generic causation—whether the combination of the chemical 
contaminants and the plaintiffs’ exposure to them had the capacity to cause the harm 
alleged.”). 
 109. Id. at 1199–200 (“[T]he district court concluded that Velsicol’s chemicals and the 
duration of the plaintiffs’ exposure to them were capable of causing the types of injuries alleged 
. . .”); Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2001) (“To prove causation in a 
toxic tort case, a plaintiff must show both that the alleged toxin is capable of causing injuries 
like that suffered by the plaintiff in human beings subjected to the same level of exposure as 
the plaintiff, and that the toxin was the cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1989), 
amended, 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1999) (“The plaintiffs did 
not offer one statistically significant (one whose confidence interval did not include 1.0) study 
that concludes that Bendectin is a human teratogen. No published epidemiological study has 
found a statistically significant increased risk between exposure to Bendectin and birth 
defects.”). 
 111. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater than Two in Proof 
of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195 (2001). 
 112. In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Colo. 1998) (“None of these 
studies reports a statistically significant elevation of risk of rheumatic or connective tissue 
disease, either classic or atypical, over 2.0.”); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 
F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Since Thrasher’s probability estimate is not founded 
upon epidemiological studies showing a relative risk of greater than two, or some other 
evidence that would lend a scientific foundation to the assertion that fragrances more likely 
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“a mathematically precise table” equating levels of exposure with levels of 
harm to establish general causation.”113  
King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Railway Company114 provides an example 
of the discussion of relative risk, the issue of general causation and probability 
analysis. In King the question was whether the deceased’s work-related 
exposure to benzene found in diesel fuel caused the multiple myeloma cancer 
from which he died. One of the issues presented was whether the plaintiff had 
to establish a relative risk of greater than two to survive a Daubert challenge 
on the issue of general causation. Addressing this issue, the court presented 
a scholarly discussion of the relationship between relative risk and proof of 
general causation. In declining to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, 
the court made several points. First, the court observed: “[w]hile important, 
a positive association presents only one piece of the causation puzzle.”115 
Second, “[o]nce an association has been found between exposure to an agent 
and development of a disease, researchers consider whether the association 
reflects a true cause-effect relationship.”116 Third, while “[e]pidemiologists 
use causation to mean that an increase in the incidence of disease among the 
exposed subjects would not have occurred had they not been exposed to the 
agent . . .117 determining causation differs from the objective inquiry into 
relative risk.” Fourth, “[a]n assessment of a causal relationship is not a 
scientific methodology as that term is used to describe logic (like a syllogism) 
and analytic methods. Instead, it involves subjective judgment.”118 Finally, 
the court noted that “[e]xperts consider several factors under different sets of 
criteria that can point to causation. Relative risk presents only one factor that 
they consider.”119 Based upon these principles, the court in King observed, 
“we believe that requiring a study to show a relative risk of 2.0 or greater is 
                                                                                                                                      
than not caused plaintiff’s injuries, it does not constitute a valid scientific connection to the 
pertinent inquiry of causation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 113. Bednar v. Bassett Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 F.3d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The Bednars 
did not need to produce ‘a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels 
of harm’ in order to show Marian’s level of exposure to gaseous formaldehyde, but only 
‘evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that [the] defendant’s emission has 
probably caused’ the harm about which they complain.”). 
 114. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009). 
 115. Id. at 39. 
 116. Id. (citing the REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at 374. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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too restrictive when the expert relies on the study to support an opinion on 
general causation.”120 Instead, the court concluded: 
So we decline to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, or any 
other statistical measurement, above the minimum requirement 
that the study show a relative risk greater than 1.0. We agree that 
“it would be far preferable for the district court to instruct the jury 
on statistical significance and then let the jury decide whether 
many studies over the 1.0 mark have any significance in 
combination.” In short, the significance of epidemiological studies 
with weak positive associations is a question of weight, not 
admissibility.121 
On the separate issue of “specific” or “actual” cause, the court explained, 
“[i]f an expert’s general causation opinion is admissible to show that a 
suspected agent should be ruled in as a possible cause of the plaintiff’s disease, 
the court must next determine whether the expert performed a reliable 
differential etiology.”122 The court explained that first, “[t]o perform an 
adequate differential etiology, a medical expert must first compile a 
comprehensive list of hypotheses that might explain the set of salient clinical 
findings under consideration.”123 Second, “the expert engages in a process of 
elimination, based on the evidence, to reach a conclusion regarding the most 
likely cause of the disease.”124 
Apart from the issue of the “relative risk” findings of a study for 
determining general causation, misclassification of “cases” can be a 
potentially non-obvious cause for bias in case-control studies.125 To avoid this 
problem, studies need to clearly define what is a “case” and when that 
individual becomes a “case.” The importance of this potential bias emerged 
in the debate about the pertussis vaccine. Between 1976 and 1979 a large case-
control study was performed in Britain called the National Childhood 
Encephalopathy Study (“NCES”).126 The case group in this study consisted of 
                                                                                                                                      
 120. Burlington N., 762 N.W.2d at 46. 
 121. Id. at 46-47 (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lit., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 
1995)). 
 122. Id. at 50. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Karen T. Copeland et al., Bias Due to Misclassification in the Estimation of Relative 
Risk, 105 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 488 (1977), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a112408. 
 126. David L. Miller & Euan McDonald Ross, National Childhood Encephalopathy Study: 
An Interim Report, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 992 (1978). 
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all children under three years of age admitted to British hospitals with the 
diagnosis of an acute serious neurological illness. The study matched the sex, 
age, and area of residence of the case group to two separate control groups. 
The study found seven post-DTP vaccination patients with severe neurologic 
deficits. Extrapolation of this number revealed a rate of permanent 
neurologic of 1:330,000.127  
A British court thoroughly examined the NCES study in 1988.128 The judge 
ruled that the NCES study misclassified three of the seven post-DTP 
vaccination patients as having severe neurologic deficits. The judge 
concluded that two of the patients had a viral illness and one was a case of 
Reye’s syndrome. After this reevaluation of the results of the study, there was 
no significant increase of encephalopathy in the vaccinated patients.  
The NCES study and the follow-up case illustrate two points. First, a case-
control study needs to be careful about the definition of what is termed a 
“case”. The NCES provided data on 5.4 million child-years of observation, 
but the judge’s reclassification of three patients changed the result from 
statistically significant to not.129 Second, in the setting of a trial where medical 
literature is cited, it makes sense to intensely scrutinize and challenge the 
literature rather than simply taking a study at face value.  
d.  Fourth Level of Reliability under the Oxford Standards: The 
Cohort Study 
Cohort studies rank higher under the Oxford standards than case-
controlled studies. Cohort studies differ from case-control studies by being 
prospective or forward looking. In a cohort study, two or more groups of 
people are selected based upon the differences in their exposure to a 
particular agent. These groups are followed over time (prospectively) to 
determine whether they develop a particular disease or another outcome.  
An example cohort study is a follow-up lung cancer study performed by 
Drs. Doll and Hill. Doctors Doll and Hill followed their case-control smoking 
study with what they deemed to be a more reliable cohort study. They sent 
questionnaires to 40,000 men and women in the British Medical Register. 
They separated the smokers and non-smokers into different groups and then 
                                                                                                                                      
 127. David L. Miller et al., Pertussis Immunisation and Serious Acute Neurological Illness 
in Children, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 1595 (1981); Simon Shorvon & Anne Berg, Pertussis Vaccination 
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 128. Loveday v. Renton (1990) 1 Med. L.R. 117 (Q.B.). 
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followed up with them in different intervals to determine whether any died, 
and if they did die, from what cause. They found smoking to be statistically 
significantly associated with lung cancer-induced mortality.130  
In general, evidence-based medicine favors cohort studies over case-
control studies, however, neither of these observational epidemiological 
studies can prove causation. They can only show correlation. To prove 
causation, researchers and the courts often rely on criteria termed the 
“Bradford Hill” factors for causation.131  
The Bradford Hill factors provide another example of a generally accepted 
methodology for determining the causal relationship between a source and 
disease or outcome. Such factors may be admissible under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence Rule 803(17) as protocol generally followed by people within a 
particular occupation.132 Once admitted, the expert can walk down the steps 
and explain how the methodology provided a basis for a differential etiology, 
another well-established methodology that can be validated by expert 
testimony as generally relied upon by medical experts in the field. Courts 
have judicially noticed the methodologies of differential diagnosis and 
etiology as reliable methodologies for determining issues of diagnosis and 
causation.133 
The nine Bradford Hill factors are (1) temporal relationship, (2) strength 
of the association, (3) dose-response relationship, (4) replication of the 
findings, (5) biological plausibility, (6) consideration of alternative 
explanations, (7) cessation of exposure, (8) specificity of the association, and 
(9) consistency with other knowledge.134 To apply this to the case of smoking 
and lung cancer, if the study shows a dose-response relationship of smoking 
and lung cancer, then that would serve as supporting evidence for causality. 
                                                                                                                                      
 130. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, The Mortality of Doctors in Relation to Their Smoking 
Habits, 1 BRIT. MED. J.1451, 1454, 1455 (1954). 
 131. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009) (citing FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 340 (2d ed. 2000) and MICHAEL 
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App. 2002); Carlson v. Okerstrom, 675 N.W.2d 
89 (Neb. 2004); Schafersman v. Agland Coop., 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001). 
 134. Burlington N., 762 N.W.2d at 40 (citing MICHAEL D. GREEN ET AL., Reference Guide on 
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 131, at 375-76.). 
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The more Bradford Hill factors that apply to the situation, the greater the 
probability of causality.135  
The issue of bias in a cohort study is always important to review. The two 
groups selected in the cohort study need to be as close as possible to being 
identical, with the sole exception being their exposure to the agent being 
studied. The greater the differences between the groups, the greater the risk 
of bias. 136 
e.  Fifth Level: Cross-Sectional Studies 
Diagnostic studies often utilize the cross-sectional method. The diagnostic 
test being studied (the “index test”) and a reference test are administered to 
a given patient population. The results of the tests are compared to determine 
the accuracy of the index test. The studied patient population can be selected 
via either the case-control method or a consecutive series method. In the 
case-control selection, the researcher selects case patients with a known 
disease and compares them to control patients who are known not to have 
the disease. This artificial selection of a patient pool is performed because the 
methodology is cheap and fast. For this reason, it is often used in the initial 
evaluation of a diagnostic test or in the evaluation of a rare disease. However, 
just because a test has good accuracy in the artificial environment of a case-
control study does not necessarily mean that the test will be accurate in the 
clinical setting. To best test for the accuracy of a diagnostic test in the clinical 
setting, a consecutive series method is used. In this method, patients 
suspected of having the disease, but in whom disease status is unknown, are 
given both the index test and the reference test. Ideally, these patients are 
consecutively chosen from the appropriate clinical setting.137  
The patient group composition can dramatically affect the study results. A 
study which only includes very sick patients and perfectly healthy patients 
will make a test look better than it is. This is called spectrum bias.138 The 
prevalence of disease, severity of disease, and presence of comorbid 
conditions can all have a big effect. For example, a mammogram on a 
screening population will have different sensitivity and specificity for disease 
than a mammogram on a patient population with a palpable lump. The 
physician or expert using the study needs to ascertain whether the patient 
population in the study is similar to the clinical patient or patient in the legal 
trial. 
                                                                                                                                      
 135. Höfler, supra note 131, at 11. 
 136. Copeland, Supra note 124.  
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The clinical relevance of a diagnostic test’s accuracy must always be 
assessed. If the test result is highly accurate but the information does not 
change patient outcome, then the increased accuracy may be irrelevant.  
The reference test can be a source of bias. In “incorporation bias,” the 
index test result is incorporated into the reference test. This can artificially 
increase the accuracy of the index test. To avoid this, interpreters of the 
reference test should be blinded to the result of the index test and vice versa.139  
f.  Sixth Level: Randomized Controlled Trials 
In a randomized controlled trial (“RCT”), patients are randomly assigned 
to the treatment group or the control group. Both groups are followed for a 
pre-specified time period and analyzed in terms of a specific outcome at the 
outset of the study. The randomization of patients reduces the risk of 
selection bias.  
Case-control and cohort studies are observational studies in the sense that 
the researcher need not directly change the behavior of the participants. On 
the other hand, a RCT does precisely determine the treatment plan/behavior 
of its participants. This is advantageous in reducing bias, but it can also make 
a RCT ethically problematic such as when assessing the toxicity of an agent, 
such as smoking.  
An RCT can also be prone to a number of biases. Selection bias can still 
occur in a RCT if there is imperfect randomization or if there is a failure to 
randomize all eligible patients. Performance bias is a systematic difference in 
the care provided to the randomized groups, apart from the intervention 
being studied. Exclusion bias is systematic differences in withdrawals from 
the trial. Detection bias occurs in systematic differences of outcome 
assessment, this is particularly common when there is a failure to blind the 
assessors to the randomization status of patients.140 Another bias occurs when 
those who fail to complete a clinical trial are ignored. In general, this bias 
tends to be in favor of the intervention. For this reason, studies with a low 
follow-up rate are generally considered untrustworthy and studies are 
generally analyzed on an “intent-to-treat” basis.141 Although not a source of 
bias, a limitation of a RCT can be the clinical relevance of the measured 
outcome. The outcome being measured may be quantifiable, and thus easy 
to study, but that does not mean that it has practical clinical value. Despite 
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these listed limitations, an RCT is favored over observational studies because 
a properly performed RCT can eliminate many of the sources of potential 
bias in research.  
g.  Highest Tier Evidence: Secondary Studies, Systematic Reviews, 
and Meta-Analyses and Practice Guidelines 
Primary research studies, such as observational studies and randomized 
controlled trials, collect data on individual patients. Secondary studies, such 
as meta-analyses and systematic reviews, aggregate information from 
multiple primary studies. A systematic review begins by asking a well-defined 
clinical question. Then a systematic search of the literature is performed, 
using a well-defined and reproducible search strategy, to find all primary 
research articles that ask the specified clinical question. The researcher then 
closely scrutinizes the methods of the aggregated studies. If the methods fit 
the strict and explicit criteria, then that study’s results need to be included in 
the analysis, regardless of the results of that study. A meta-analysis begins 
with a systematic review but then goes further by applying statistics to 
quantify the results of the systematic review.  
There are several advantages of a systematic review and a meta-analysis 
over a primary study. First, by grouping smaller primary studies, a meta-
analysis may change a trend found in the primary studies to a statistically 
significant finding. Second, meta-analyses can help resolve contradictory 
findings among the different primary studies. Finally, the results of a meta-
analysis are more robust, more generalizable, and more likely to be true.142  
However, meta-analyses/systematic reviews are not without weaknesses. 
They can replicate and magnify flaws in the original primary studies. 
Additionally, meta-analysis can yield false results if the underlying studies are 
done on different patient populations or use different methodologies, which 
frequently occurs.143  
Medical societies create committees of respected physicians to review the 
scientific literature and create evidence-based medicine practice 
guidelines.144 These guidelines are published to assist practitioners in making 
daily clinical decisions. Committee members who design the guidelines often 
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debate at length about the wording of the guidelines. As a result, the final 
publication often represents a compromise between differing physician 
opinions.  
Physicians and experts generally view practice guideline 
recommendations as a high level of evidence, comparable to systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses.145 For example, in Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. 
Dobbins,146 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in considering a malpractice 
claim denying a causal theory of “maternal forces,” reversed a trial court’s 
exclusion of a compendium of studies released in 2014 by the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) on “Neonatal Brachial 
Plexus Palsy” even though the purpose of the compendium was 
[t]o review and summarize the current state of the scientific 
knowledge, as set forth in the peer-reviewed and relevant 
historical literature, about the mechanisms which may result in 
neonatal brachial plexus palsy. The purpose of conducting such 
review is to produce a report which will succinctly summarize the 
relevant research on the pathophysiology of neonatal brachial 
plexus palsy.147 
But practice guidelines and systematic reviews are not infallible. 
Unfortunately, studies have shown that some practice guidelines have serious 
shortcomings.148 And at times practice guidelines held by differing medical 
societies can have widely disparate recommendations despite the fact that the 
differing recommendations from the societies are all based on the same 
primary studies.149  
h.  Limitations of the Oxford Levels of Evidence 
The Oxford Center does not intend for its ranking system to be the final 
say in the assessment of the quality of a study. Exceptions exist where 
research studies exceed or fall behind the expectations of the model of the 
Levels of Evidence. Consequently, the use of this heuristic requires a “healthy 
dose of skepticism and judgement . . . to appraise evidence and apply it to 
                                                                                                                                      
 145. Brief for Wisconsin Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bayer 
ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 2015AP1470), 2015 
WL 9596321; Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 
1802 (2015). 
 146. Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).  
 147. Id. at 176. 
 148. Roberto Grilli et al., Practice Guidelines Developed by Specialty Societies: The Need for 
a Critical Appraisal, 355 LANCET 103 (2000); Jonathan L. Mezrich & Charles S. Resnik, Panacea 
or Sham? Legal Issues of Vertebroplasty, 13 J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY 663 (2016). 
 149. Id. 
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individuals in routine practice.”150 This skepticism requires the clinician to 
go beyond the Levels of Evidence analysis to delve into the details of the 
methods and results of each research study.  
III.  APPLICATION 
Apart from the ranking of levels of reliability for the various studies, there 
remains the “fit” of the study to the “facts of the case.” This “fitness” issue is 
often considered in the context of the “application” level of the analysis. The 
courts often ask whether the expert’s opinion is an “unfair extrapolation” 
from the studies being relied upon.  
On the issue of factual application, the United States Supreme Court in 
General Electric Co. v. Joiner151 explained: 
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence 
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A 
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered.152 
However, the Daubert analysis “is not intended to supplant the adversarial 
process.”153  Even “shaky” expert testimony may be admitted if the Daubert 
standard is satisfied, subject to cross-examination.154 More specifically, 
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”155 
                                                                                                                                      
 150. Jeremy Howick et al., Explanation of the 2011 Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based 
Medicine (OCEBM) Levels of Evidence (Background Document), OXFORD CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-
BASED MED. (May 1, 2016), https://www.cebm.net/index.aspx?o=5653.  
 151. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 152. Id. at 146. 
We further hold that, because it was within the District Court’s discretion to 
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied were not sufficient, 
whether individually or in combination, to support their conclusions that 
Joiner’s exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding their testimony. 
Id. at 146-47. 
 153. Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 154. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (2010) (“Determination on admissibility should 
not supplant the adversarial process; ‘shaky’ expert testimony may be admissible, assailable by 
its opponents through cross-examination.”). 
 155. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).   
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In Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins,156 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
adopted Daubert as the standard of admissibility for Wisconsin state courts. 
157  Bayer, a medical malpractice case, provides a useful example. In Bayer, a 
mother sued her obstetrician for medical malpractice claiming that his 
negligence during delivery resulted in her baby having a permanent brachial 
plexus injury.158 In defense, the obstetrician cited numerous scientific articles 
supporting the expert’s opinion that it is more likely that maternal forces 
caused the injury, not the physician’s actions.159 The trial court excluded the 
defense’s use of the “maternal forces” literature claiming, “the problem that I 
see with everything that is being done on this from the defense standpoint is 
that these articles are not distinguishing between permanent brachial plexus 
injuries and temporary brachial plexus injuries.”160 In essence, the court 
excluded the compendium of research studies because the articles’ measured 
outcome, of both permanent and temporary brachial plexus injuries, differed 
from the patient’s measured outcome of only a permanent brachial plexus 
injury.161 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because 
“neither the Bayers nor the circuit court have explained why the defense 
experts should not be permitted to extrapolate from the multiple peer-
reviewed articles that, while supporting the maternal forces theory for 
causation, fail to distinguish between temporary and permanent brachial 
plexus injuries.”162   
Bayer suggests that if a study follows proper protocol then the courts 
should permit an expert to extrapolate from the scientific literature to the 
facts of the case. The level of “unfair extrapolation” will always be a Daubert 
“application” question, but courts are less likely to exclude such evidence if 
the underlying principles and methodologies of the studies are reliable and 
the experts can explain the relevancy of any differences in “fitness” of the 
facts. 
                                                                                                                                      
 156. Bayer ex rel. Petrucelli v. Dobbins, 885 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). 
 157. Id. at 180.  
 158. Id. at 175.  
 159. Id. at 180 (“Dobbins cited over twenty peer-reviewed publications supporting his 
claim that maternal forces of labor caused Unity's injury.”).  
 160. Id. at 178. 
 161. See id. at 182-84.   
 162. Bayer, 885 N.W.2d at 182. 
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A. Evidence-Based Subjects for Cross-Examination of the Expert Beyond the 
Pyramid Ranking of the Studies 
1. Bias and Statistical Error in the Medical Literature 
Unfortunately, it is well established that bias and statistical error result in 
a high percentage of false results in medical literature.163 This question of 
potential research errors should be queried whenever any peer-reviewed 
study is relied upon by an expert when giving expert testimony. A few 
corollaries exist to predict the truthfulness of an article.164 In general, the 
greater the financial interests, other interests, and prejudices in a scientific 
field, the less likely the research findings are to be true. For example, studies 
performed by drug manufacturers on their own drugs are less likely to be true 
due to financial bias. But bias need not just be financial.  Some scientists bias 
their results to obtain public acclaim or to acquire tenure. In “scientific bias,” 
researchers alter the results to reinforce the prevailing scientific theory. These 
biases need not be either conscious or intentional to be a source of unreliable 
evidence.165 
Even assuming the absence of any bias, research studies can be false simply 
because of statistical mishaps. These statistical mishaps occur more 
frequently when the studies are smaller, when the studied effect size is 
smaller, or when a study reveals an unexpected result.166 Because of the 
susceptibility to error, the scientific literature needs to be critiqued before 
being used by a physician or before it is relied upon in expert testimony.   
2.   Critique Based upon a Study Using Journal Quality and Study-
Type: Ranking Scientific Journals 
Not all peer-reviewed research is equally reliable. Consequently, 
physicians and expert witnesses need to have techniques to sift out weak 
studies. One way to start this literature critique is to start with the medical 
journal quality. Journal quality can be measured using impact factors. An 
impact factor is a number that reflects the average number of times a 
particular journal has been cited by other journals. A higher impact factor 
means more citations and, presumably means, a greater likelihood of 
                                                                                                                                      
 163. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings are False, 2 PLOS MED. 
e124 (2005);  M. Carrington Reid et al., Use of Methodological Standards in Diagnostic Test 
Research. Getting Better but Still Not Good., 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 645 (1995); Anne W.S. 
Rutjes et al., Evidence of Bias and Variation in Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, 174 CANADIAN 
MED. ASS’N J. 469 (2006). 
 164. Ioannidis, supra note 163, at e124. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. (The lower the pretest odds, the less likely it is to be true). 
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scientific respect. One limitation of the impact factors is that a citation in a 
low-ranking journal is given equal weight to a citation from a high-ranking 
journal. The Eigenfactor value overcomes this limitation by giving weight to 
citations that come from highly rated journals.167 A journal may be ranked 
under the Eigenfactor by researching EIGENFACTOR.org.  The online 
SCImago journal rank168 is an example of rating journals by Eigenfactor. If a 
witness relies upon a study, counsel for either the proponent or opponent 
should review the Eigenfactor to credit or discredit any reliance given to the 
study in the expert’s opinion. While the quality of a scientific journal is 
relevant in the assessment of a given research article, this ranking is not 
determinative.  There are countless examples of incorrect research results in 
highly esteemed journals, and there are many great articles published in 
lesser known journals.     
3.   Critiquing the Details of a Study’s Methodology 
a.   Flow diagrams 
After critiquing a study based on general features, such as its ranking 
within Oxford’s Level of Evidence, potential bias, and the ranking of the 
journal of origin, the expert needs to review and potentially critique the 
detailed methods of the study. Reading the methods section of papers can be 
confusing, even for experts. To simplify this process, readers are encouraged 
to create flow diagrams. These diagrams create a visual aid that breaks down 
the methods of a study into many different steps.169 These diagrams can be a 
useful aid for physicians, expert witnesses, judges, and juries as they all seek 
to understand the detailed methods of a research study.   
These flow diagrams are best explained by example. Here is an example of 
a flow diagram, created by the QUADAS group, of a cohort study that sought 
to determine whether B-type natriuretic peptide levels could be utilized to 
diagnose heart failure:170 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 167. Carl T. Bergstrom et al., The Eigenfactor™ Metrics, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 11433 (2008).   
 168. SCImago Journal Rank, SCIMAGO, http://www.scimagojr.com (last visited Nov. 28, 
2018). 
 169. Penny F. Whiting et al., QUADAS-2: A Revised Tool for the Quality Assessment of 
Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 529 (2011). 
 170. Id.; Helen E. Smith et al., Biochemical Diagnosis of Ventricular Dysfunction in Elderly 
Patients in General Practice: Observational Study, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 906 (2000). 
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Here is an example flow diagram created by the STARD group for 
diagnostic studies:171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 171. Patrick M. Bossuyt et al., The STARD Statement for Reporting Studies of Diagnostic 
Accuracy: Explanation and Elaboration, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. W1 (2003). Patrick M. 
Bossuyt et al. for the STARD Group, STARD 2015: An Updated List of Essential Items for 
Reporting Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, BRITISH MED. J. (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4623764/. 
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Flow diagrams can also be created for systematic reviews and meta-
analyses:172   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b.   Challenging the methods (CASP) 
After creating a flow-diagram of a study, the physician or witness is now 
ready to critically challenge the details of the study’s methodology. 
Standardized techniques have been developed to analyze the methods of a 
study.173 One of these methods is the Critical Appraisal Skills Program 
                                                                                                                                      
 172. David Moher et al., Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses: The PRISMA Statement, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 264 (2009). 
 173. Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 1802 
(2015); Penny F. Whiting et al., QUADAS-2: A Revised Tool for the Quality Assessment of 
Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 529 (2011).   
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(“CASP”).174 CASP directs the reader to ask pointed questions of the study in 
assessing for bias and applicability. CASP has different questionnaires for 
each of the types of studies discussed previously. CASP also has a few 
questionnaires for study types that we have not discussed, such as qualitative 
studies. A physician, expert witness, or lawyer can use the CASP 
questionnaires to better form their opinion about the biases of the study and 
the potential applicability of the study in their specific clinical situation.  
c.   Understanding and critiquing research statistics: comparing 
two groups to determine any statistical difference 
 (1)   Null hypothesis 
A “null hypothesis” states that two measured populations have no 
statistically significant difference.175 To use smoking and lung cancer as an 
example, a null hypothesis would state that the incidence of lung cancer is 
the same in those who smoke compared to those who do not smoke. If the 
lung cancer study reveals a statistically significant difference between the 
groups, then the null hypothesis would be rejected and the conclusion would 
be that there is a correlation between smoking and lung cancer.   
 (2)   P-value 
A p-value quantifies the likelihood that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the two groups compared in the null hypothesis. If a p-
value is .01 then there is a 99% probability that the null hypothesis is false. 
Conversely, if a p-value has a 5% chance that the null hypothesis is false, then 
there is a 95% probability that chance alone could account for the measured 
differences between the groups. Scientists in general prefer to have a p-value 
of less than .05 before saying that a study reveals a statistically significant 
likelihood of the null hypothesis being false. If the p-value is greater than .05 
then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.   
 (3)   Type 1 error  
A “type 1” error occurs when a study rejects a true null hypothesis.176 Even 
if all bias has been removed, a type 1 error can occur strictly out of chance 
alone. For example, if a study rejects a null hypothesis based on a p-value of 
                                                                                                                                      
 174. CASP Checklists, CRITICAL APPRAISAL SKILLS PROGRAMME, https://casp-uk.net/casp-
tools-checklists (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 175. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR. ET 
AL., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 122 (2d ed. 2000); BRIAN EVERITT, THE 
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS (1998). 
 176. ROBERT H. RIFFENBURGH, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE (3d ed. 2012). 
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.05, then 5% of the time an error was made and the null hypothesis was 
actually true. If the study has bias, and most studies do have some bias, then 
the chance of a type 1 error can be greater.   
 (4)   Type 2 error 
A “type 2” error occurs when a study finds no difference between the 
measured groups even though a real difference exists.177 Studies that do not 
enroll enough patients are at risk for type 2 errors because the results may 
not be strong enough to show a statistically significant result.  Such studies 
are said to be “underpowered.”178 Increasing the number of enrolled patients 
decreases the risk of a type 2 error but also increases the cost of the study. 
 (5)   Power calculation 
A trial should be big enough to have a high chance of detecting, as 
statistically significant, an effect if it exists. In other words, a trial should be 
“powered” to reduce the possibility of a “type 2” error. This power calculation 
can be performed before the study begins to measure the appropriate size of 
the study. The power calculation depends on the expected level of difference 
between the two groups that would constitute a clinically significant effect 
and the mean/standard deviation of the principal outcome variable.  
d.   Using statistics to show association between an agent and 
outcome 
 (1)   Absolute risks and relative risks 
The “absolute risk” is the probability of an event occurring in a given 
patient population.179 The relative risk is calculated as the quotient of the 
“absolute risk of the test group” divided by the “absolute risk of the control 
group.” A relative risk of 1.00 means that the measured outcome is equally 
prevalent in the test group as in the control group. A relative risk of 2.00 
means that the measured outcome is twice as common in the test group as in 
the control group. 
Some courts use a relative risk of 2.00 as evidence that a particular 
causative agent is more likely than not to have been the cause of the negative 
                                                                                                                                      
 177. Patrick M. Bossuyt et al., The STARD Statement for Reporting Studies of Diagnostic 
Accuracy: Explanation and Elaboration, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. W1 (2003). Patrick M. 
Bossuyt et al. for the STARD Group, STARD 2015: An Updated List of Essential Items for 
Reporting Diagnostic Accuracy Studies, BRIT. MED. J. (Oct. 28, 2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4623764/. 
 178. Id. 
 179. RIFFENBURGH, supra note 176. 
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outcome.180 A relative risk of less than 2.00 can still be attributed to the 
causative agent, but it is not more likely than not. However, using the 2.00 
relative risk as a determinant factor does confuse the notion of general 
causality and specific causality. A study showing a toxin causes cancer with a 
relative risk of 1.8 reveals the general causality of that toxin. However, a given 
patient may have a greater or lesser risk depending on that patient’s other 
risk factors. An expert witness will be needed to extrapolate the specific 
relative risk to the patient from the research study general causality relative 
risk. 
A few other terms are often used: 
Relative Risk Reduction = 1 – Relative Risk 
Absolute Risk Reduction = Absolute Risk of Therapy – Absolute Risk of 
Control 
Number Needed to Treat = 1 / Absolute Risk Reduction 
 (2)   Odds ratio 
An odds ratio (“OR”) is another measure of association between an 
exposure and an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will 
occur given a particular exposure compared to the odds of the outcome 
occurring in the absence of that exposure. The odds ratio can be calculated 
from a 2 x 2 frequency table. 
 
 Outcome Status 
+ - 
Exposure Status + A B 
- C D 
OR = (A/C) / (B/D) = (A*D) / (B*C)  
 
If the OR equals one, then there is no association between the exposure 
and the outcome. If the OR is greater than one, then the exposure is positively 
associated, or correlates, with the outcome. If the OR is less than one, then 
the exposure is negatively associated with the outcome.  
Case-control studies use odds ratios instead of relative risk because relative 
risk cannot be calculated in these studies. In case-control studies, the 
prevalence of disease is unknown so absolute risks cannot be calculated.   
 (3)   Confidence intervals 
Confidence intervals describe a range of values in which the true value lies 
within a certain degree of probability. In general, confidence intervals use a 
                                                                                                                                      
 180. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Neb. 2009). 
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95% probability. This means that the chance that the true value lies within 
the range specified by the confidence intervals is 95%. Odds ratios and 
relative risks are often stated with confidence intervals. If the stated 
confidence interval of an odds-ratio or a relative risk overlap with 1.00, then 
there is no statistically significant correlation between the causative agent and 
the outcome.  
e.   Using statistics to appraise diagnostic tests 
Many different statistical terms are used to quantify the quality of a 
diagnostic test. These terms are derived from a standard 2 x 2 table showing 
the result of the index test on the left and the result of the reference test on 
the top, as shown in the table below.181   
 
 Result of Reference Test 
Disease Positive 
A+C 
Disease 
Negative 
B+D 
Result of Index 
Test 
Test Positive 
A+B 
True Positive 
A 
False Positive 
B 
Test Negative 
C+D 
False Negative 
C 
True Negative 
D 
 
From the above table, multiple important definitions emerge: 
 (1)   True Positive, false positive, true negative, and false 
negative 
True positive, false positive, true negative, and false negative are 
descriptive terms for a given test result.182 A test result is said to be a “true 
positive” if the index test was positive and the disease was present. A test 
result is a “false negative” if the index test result is negative but the disease is 
present.   
 (2)   Sensitivity and specificity 
Sensitivity and specificity are numeric values describing the quality of a 
test. Sensitivity is calculated as the quotient of true positive cases divided by 
all patients with the disease:  A/(A+C).  A highly sensitive test is a good 
screening test because it has a low false negative rate.   
                                                                                                                                      
 181. RIFFENBURGH, supra note 176. 
 182. Id. 
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Specificity is calculated as the quotient of the true negative cases divided 
by all patients without disease. A highly specific test is good at ruling out 
disease because there are few false positive results. 
Here are some related terms: 
Positive predictive value:  A/(A+B) 
Negative predictive value:  D/(C+D) 
Accuracy:  (A+D)/(A+B+C+D) 
 (3)   Likelihood ratios  
Likelihood ratios can be used on diagnostic tests to determine the 
probability of disease.  According to Bayes’ theorem, the odds that a patient 
has a disease equals the pretest odds of disease multiplied by the test’s 
likelihood ratio.183 Each test has two likelihood ratio values, one to be used in 
the setting of a positive test result and the other to be used with a negative 
test result. These likelihood ratio values can be calculated from a test’s 
sensitivity and specificity.184   
Likelihood ratio of a positive test:  sensitivity / (1-specificity) 
Likelihood ratio of a negative test: (1-sensitivity) / specificity 
Let us say for example that the positive likelihood ratio of a test is 8.0 and 
the pretest odds for disease is 1:3 (25% probability). If we perform the test 
and the test is positive, then the post-test odds of disease is 8:3 (73% 
probability). This calculation helps reveal the importance of knowing the 
pretest odds of disease in interpreting the results of any diagnostic test.185   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the early 1990’s both the courts and the medical profession began to be 
concerned about investigating the reliability of expert opinions relied upon 
in their different professions. The courts have addressed the problem by 
adopting the Daubert standard of admissibility, but the courts have given 
little guidance evaluating different levels of reliability of health-related 
testimony under the broad Daubert standards. At the same time, the medical 
profession has adopted the principles and methodology of “evidence-based 
medicine” for  teaching and practice guidelines for physicians and health-
related professions.186 This paper recommends that legal practitioners 
                                                                                                                                      
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Lisa P. Lavelle et al., Evidence-Based Practice of Radiology, 35 RADIOGRAPHICS 1802 
(2015). 
 186. Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the 
Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420 (1992); see also Benjamin Djulbegovic & 
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become more familiar with the techniques employed by evidence-based 
medicine in the direct and cross-examination of experts in both health-
related and analogous fields where both expert testimony and learned 
treatises are relied upon in support of expert testimony. 
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